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ABSTRACT
Norms have been extensively proposed as coordination mechanisms
for both agent and human societies. Nevertheless, choosing the
norms to regulate a society is by no means straightforward. The
reasons are twofold. First, the norms to choose from may not be
independent (i.e, they can be related to each other). Second, dif-
ferent preference criteria may be applied when choosing the norms
to enact. This paper advances the state of the art by modeling a
series of decision-making problems that regulation authorities con-
front when choosing the policies to establish. In order to do so,
we first identify three different norm relationships –namely, gen-
eralisation, exclusivity, and substitutability– and we then consider
norm representation power, cost, and associated moral values as al-
ternative preference criteria. Thereafter, we show that the decision-
making problems faced by policy makers can be encoded as linear
programs, and hence solved with the aid of state-of-the-art solvers.
CCS Concepts
•Computing methodologies→ Multi-agent systems; Coopera-
tion and coordination;
Keywords
Normative systems, value-based reasoning, norm decision making,
policy making, optimisation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Norms have been extensively studied as coordination mecha-
nisms within both agent and human societies[10, 26]. Within agent
societies, problems such as norm synthesis [27, 7], norm emer-
gence [14, 29], or norm learning [25, 11, 24] have been widely
studied. As for human societies, e-participation and e-governance
ICT systems are currently attracting a lot of attention [30, 12, 2].
Thus, for example, some regulatory authorities in European cities
–such as Reykjavik[6] or Barcelona[4] municipalities– are open-
ing their policy making to citizens. This is also the case for some
countries: New Zealand authorities are opening consultations about
legislations related to different topics such as family violence[1] or
pensions[3]. However, the number of regulations to discuss and
enact could be large –consider, for example, Madrid’s participation
portal [5], which is currently hosting more than two thousand lo-
cal proposals open to citizens– so that managing them becomes a
complex task.
Beyond the intrinsic complexity due to the number of norms to
manage –either if they are proposed by humans or automatically
generated–, by no means we can state that choosing the norms to
regulate a society constitutes a straightforward process. The rea-
sons are twofold.
On the one hand, norms can be related. Norm relationships have
been previously studied in the literature. Thus, for example, Grossi
and Dignum [15] study the relation between abstract and concrete
norms, whereas Kollingbaum, Vasconcelos et al. [19, 28] focus
on norm conflicts —and solve them based on first-order unification
and constraint solving techniques. In this paper we borrow some
of the relationships identified in Morales et al. [23]1 and charac-
terise three different binary norm relationships, namely, generali-
sation, exclusivity, and substitutability. Thus, we can consider a set
of norms and the fact that some norms in this set generalise some
specific norms; that some other norms are pair-wise incompatible
(i.e., mutually exclusive); or interchangeable (that is, substitutable).
When this is the case, a regulatory authority should not select these
norms to be simultaneously established in the society. This paper
proposes to encode these relationships in terms of restrictions in
linear programs that allows to find those norm subsets (subsets of
the given set of norms) that are compliant with the constraints im-
posed by the associated norm relations.
On the other hand, this paper also characterises the problems that
regulation authorities confront when considering different prefer-
ence criteria over the norms to impose. In this manner, we specify
the optimisation problem of finding the subset of norms that, in
addition to comply with the relation constraints, maximizes rep-
resented norms. This problem can be specified as a single objec-
tive function in a binary linear program. Moreover, since norms
have associated costs, it may also be of convenience to specify a
multi-objective decision function that maximizes norm representa-
tion while minimizing associated norm costs. Our final contribu-
tion is the consideration of moral values associated to norms as an
additional criterion. Values have been studied in argumentation –
some representative examples being Bench-Capon et al.[9] or Mod-
gil [20]– and they have also been introduced by Kohler et al. [18]
in multi-agent institutions. However, to the best of our knowledge,
no one has considered the values that norms support. Instead, the
normative multi-agent systems research area has focused in differ-
ent normative concepts such as minimality and simplicity [13, 22],
liberality [23], compactness [21], or stability [26].
1Morales et al. [23] identify substitutability, generalisation and
complementarity relations.
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In this paper we assume that a regulatory authority has available
a collection of norms to impose together with an specification of
the particular relationships that hold for these norms and that pre-
vents all norms to be simultaneously deployed. Then, we model
alternative problems that pursue to maximize the set of norms to
establish under (a combination of) those previously mentioned cri-
teria, namely, norm representation, associated costs, and supported
moral values. Subsequently, despite the computation complexity
of these problems, state-of-the-art linear programming solvers are
used to automatically compute their solution.
The paper is structured as follows. First, next section provides
some basic definitions and an illustrative example. Then, subse-
quent sections characterise our different optimisation problems. Ini-
tially, Section 3 considers optimisation problems with a single ob-
jective: maximising norm representation. Then, Section 4 consid-
ers a multi-objective decision function that combines norm repre-
sentation and cost criteria. Finally, Section 5 introduces moral val-
ues into this multi-objective optimisation problem. The paper con-
cludes with additional discussion about dealing with norms in force
in Section 6, and conclusions and future work in Section 7.
2. BASIC DEFINITIONS
Before introducing the decision problems involving norms that
we face in this paper, next we introduce the fundamental building
blocks to build such problems. Thus, we formally introduce the
notion of norm, the relationships that we consider between norms,
and the characteristic of the norm systems that we will aim at to
establish norm-based regulations.
Our notion of norm is based on a simplification of the one in
[31]. Thus, here we formally consider a norm ni as a pair θ(ρ, ac),
where: θ is a deontic operator (prohibition, permission, or obliga-
tion) ; ρ is a description of the addressee entity, namely, the agent
required to comply with the norm; and ac is an action –from a set
of actions– that entities can perform in a specific domain.
Now we consider the relations that may hold between norms be-
cause they will determine the way norms are selected as a part of
a norm system. With this aim, we borrow two of the relations em-
pirically identified in [23] during on-line norm synthesis and define
three norm relations (namely generalisation, exclusivity, and sub-
stitutability). Informally, it is considered that: (i) a norm is more
general than another one when it subsumes its regulation (its regu-
lation scope is wider); (ii) two norms are mutually exclusive when
they are incompatible; and (iii) two norms are substitutable if they
are interchangeable.
Let N be a non-empty set of norms for a specific domain. For-
mally, we will capture the above norm relations as follows:
i) The direct generalisation relation is a binary relation Rg ⊆
N × N . If (ni, nj) ∈ Rg , we say that ni is more gen-
eral than nj , or directly, it generalises nj . Notice also that
if (ni, nj) ∈ Rg , @nk ∈ N s.t (ni, nk), (nk, nj) ∈ Rg .
The notion of direct generalisation allows us to capture the no-
tion of indirect generalisation through the so-called ancestors.
Given two norms, nk,ni ∈ N , we say that nk is an ancestor
of ni if there is a subset of norms {n1, . . . , np} ⊆ N such
that (n1, n2), . . . , (np−1, np) ∈ Rg , n1 = nk, and np = ni.
Henceforth, given a norm ni ∈ N , we will note its ancestors
as A(ni). Notice that Rg is irreflexive, anti-symmetric, and
intransitive.
ii) The exclusivity relation is a binary relation Rx ⊆ N × N . If
(ni, nj) ∈ Rx we say that ni, nj are incompatible or mutually
exclusive. Rx is an irreflexive, symmetric, and intransitive
relation.
iii) The substitutability relation is a binary relation Rs ⊆ N ×N .
If (ni, nj) ∈ Rs, we say that norms ni, nj are interchange-
able or substitutable. Based on substitutability relationships,
we introduce the notion of substitution chain as follows. Given
two norms, ni,nk ∈ N , we say that nk is connected by sub-
stitutabilities to ni if there is a non-empty subset of norms
{n1, . . . , np} ⊆ N such that (n1, n2), . . . , (np−1, np)∈ Rs,
n1 = ni, and np = nk. Henceforth, a new relationship
S ⊆ N×N will contain the pairs of norms that are connected
by substitutabilities. In particular, notice that if (ni, nj) ∈ Rs,
then (ni, nj) ∈ S. Rs is an irreflexive, symmetric, and transi-
tive relation.
Next, we put together norms and their relationships in a structure
on which reasoning about norms will take place, the so-called norm
net.
DEF. 1. A norm net is a pair NN= 〈N,R〉, where N stands
for a set of norms andR = {Rg, Rx, Rs} contains generalisation,
exclusivity and substitutability relationships over the norms in N .
The relationships in R are mutually exclusive, namely Rg ∩Rx =
∅, Rg ∩Rs = ∅, and Rx ∩Rs = ∅.
As observed in [23], generalisation and substitutability are mu-
tually exclusive relationships. Furthermore, here we also assume
that the exclusivity relationship is mutually exclusive with the gen-
eralisation and substitutability relationships.
Given a norm net NN= 〈N,R〉, we will refer to any subset of
the norms in N as a norm system. The challenge for a decision
maker is to select a norm system out of a norm net. In general, she
will be interested in norm systems that: (i) do not contain conflict-
ing norms; (ii) do not contain overlapping regulations; and (iii) do
incorporate as many norms as possible. In what follows, we shall
characterise these types of norm systems.
First, if we consider that exclusivity relationships capture con-
flicts between norms, the following characterisation of conflict-free
norm systems naturally follows.
DEF. 2. Given a norm net NN= 〈N,R〉, we say that a norm
system Ω ⊆ N is conflict-free iff for each ni, nj ∈ Ω, (ni, nj) /∈
Rx.
Second, notice that both generalisation and substitutability rela-
tionships capture redundancy. Indeed, selecting two substitutable
norms in a norm system would involve including overlapping reg-
ulations. The same applies to two norms such that one generalises
the other, namely the regulation of the more general one subsumes
that of the more specific. Hence, we characterise non-redundant
norm systems as follows.
DEF. 3. Given a norm net NN= 〈N,R〉, we say that a norm
system Ω ⊆ N is non-redundant iff for each ni, nj ∈ Ω: (i)
(ni, nj) /∈ Rg and nj /∈ A(ni); and (ii) (ni, nj) /∈ S
From the concepts above, we are ready to characterise the type
of norm systems a decision maker will be interested in.
DEF. 4. Given a norm net NN= 〈N,R〉, we say that a norm
system Ω ⊆ N is sound iff it is both conflict-free and non-redundant.
EXAMPLE 1. Figure 1 illustrates an example of a Norm Net
that includes some norms (rules) of border control at an interna-
tional airport. Norms are depicted as circles labeled as n1, . . . , n5
respectively. In particular, they are defined as follows:
n2=Obl(all, 
register-passport)
n3=Obl(all, 
fulfil-form)
n5=Obl(visitors, 
fulfil_form)
n4=Obl(locals, 
fulfil_form)
n1=Perm(all,  
cross_border) 
x
x 
x 
x
x
x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Generalisation x  x x x Exclusivity o o o o Substitutability
Figure 1: Norm Net example: rules of border control at an interna-
tional airport.
n1 : Permission(all_passengers, cross_border)
n2 : Obligation(all_passengers, register_passport)
n3 : Obligation(all_passengers, fulfil_form)
n4 : Obligation(locals, fulfil_form)
n5 : Obligation(visitors, fulfil_form)
Norm n1 rules free movement of passengers, allowing all pas-
sengers to cross the border without any additional action. On the
other hand, norm n2 requires all passengers to register their pass-
port, and there is still a third rule n3 that requires them to fulfil
a form asking for passport information such as passport number,
holder’s name or address.
Regarding exclusivity relationships, first and second norms are
exclusive ((n1, n2) ∈ Rx) because it is not possible to ask pas-
sengers to perform an action (in this case, register their passport)
and allow them to go ahead and simply cross the border. The same
reasoning applies for first and third norms, and thus, n1 and n3 are
also exclusive ((n1, n3) ∈ Rx). Figure 1 depicts such exclusivity
relationships with an “x dotted” line.
Additionally, there is a substitutability relationship between sec-
ond and third norms ((n2, n3) ∈ Rx), since it is possible to "mon-
itor" which passengers are actually crossing the border by register-
ing their password or by asking them to fulfil a form. Passengers
may even have to abide by both norms, since they could actually do
both things despite of its redundancy. Figure 1 shows this substi-
tutability relationship with an “o dotted” line.
Having a closer look to norm n3, we can see that asking all pas-
sengers to fulfill a form is a generalisation of two other norms: n4,
which requires local passengers to fulfill a form; and n5, which
requires foreign passengers (visitors) to fulfill a form. Formally,
we have ((n3, n4) ∈ Rg) and ((n3, n5) ∈ Rg). Figure 1 draws
this generalisation relationship with an arrow line. Since gener-
alisation is an anti-symmetric relationship, the arrowhead points
towards the general norm.
3. FINDINGAMAXIMUMNORMSYSTEM
The purpose of this section is to design the optimisation machin-
ery required to help a regulation authority find a particular type of
sound norm system. Since the regulation authority’s purpose is to
incorporate as many norms as possible out of those proposed in a
norm net, informally we will aim at the norm system that repre-
sents the largest number of norms in the norm net. With this goal
in mind, we first start in section 3.1 by formally casting our prob-
lem as an optimisation problem, and by characterising its hardness.
Thereafter, we show how to encode our problem as a linear pro-
gram so that it can be solved with the aid of state-of-the-art linear
programming solvers. Finally, in section 3.2 we discuss on several
ways of computing the representativeness of a norm system.
3.1 The maximum norm system problem
We first focus on defining how to obtain the representation power
of a normative system. This is based on the representation power
of each of its norms. Since we can think of several ways of com-
puting a norm’s representation power (e.g. a norm can represent
itself, or all the norms it generalises), as discussed in section 3.2,
for now we just consider that we will count on a linear function,
the so-called representation power function, r : N → R that yields
such value. Besides linearity, the only condition that we will im-
pose on r is that r(ni) ≤ r(nj) for each nj ∈ A(ni). Hence,
the representation power of a normative system Ω can be readily
obtained by adding the representation power of its norms, namely
ρ(Ω) =
∑
n∈Ω r(n).
Now we are ready to formalise our optimisation problem.
PROBLEM 1. Given a norm net NN= 〈N,R〉 and a representa-
tion power function r, the maximum norm system problem (MNSP)
is that of finding a sound norm system Ω with the maximum rep-
resentation power, namely such that there is no other norm system
Ω′ ⊆ N such that ρ(Ω′) > ρ(Ω).
LEMMA 1. The complexity of the maximum norm system prob-
lem is at least NP-Hard.
PROOF. 1. The proof goes trivially by reduction of the maxi-
mum independent set problem, which is known to be an NP-Hard
optimisation problem [17], to the maximum norm system problem.
Consider that we want to find the maximum independent set of a
graph G = (V,E). Now say that each vertex in V stands for a
norm and each edge in E stands for an exclusivity relationship in
Rx. From this follows, that finding the maximum independent set of
G amounts to solving the maximum norm set problem on the norm
net 〈V, {Rx}〉, where the representation power function is defined
as r(v) = 1 for each v ∈ V .
Next we show how to solve the MNSP by encoding the optimisa-
tion problem as a linear program. Thus, consider a norm net NN=
〈N,R〉, and a set of binary decision variables {x1, . . . , x|N|}, where
each xi encodes the decision of whether norm ni is selected (taking
value 1) for a norm system or not (taking value 0). Thus, solving
the MNSP amounts to solving the following linear program:
max
|N|∑
i=1
r(ni) · xi (1)
subject to the constraints that capture the generalisation, exclusiv-
ity, and substitutatibility relationships in the norm net, which we
specify as follows:
• A family of generalisation constraints to avoid redundancy.
Such constraints impose that:
– A norm cannot be selected together with any of the
norms that it directly generalises. Given a norm ni, the
norms generalised by ni is defined asChildren(ni) =
{nj |(ni, nj) ∈ Rg}. Then, formally the following
constraints must hold:
xi +xj ≤ 1 nj ∈ Children(ni) 1 ≤ i ≤ |N | (2)
– All the children of a norm cannot be simultaneously
selected. Formally:∑
nj∈Children(ni)
xj < |Children(ni)| 1 ≤ i ≤ |N | (3)
– A norm cannot be simultaneously selected together with
any of its ancestors, namely:
xi + xk ≤ 1 nk ∈ A(ni) 1 ≤ i ≤ |N | (4)
• Exclusivity constraints preventing that two mutually exclu-
sive (incompatible) norms are jointly selected to be part of a
norm system. Thus, the following constraints must hold:
xi + xj ≤ 1 for each (ni, nj) ∈ Rx (5)
• Substitutability constraints avoiding that interchangeable norms
are simultaneously selected. This amounts to enforcing that
any pair of norms that are connected by substitutabilities can-
not be simultaneously selected, namely:
xi + xj ≤ 1 for each (ni, nj) ∈ S (6)
Notice that this constraint ensures that two norms in Rs are
not jointly selected.
Furthermore, we must also consider the binary constraints corre-
sponding to the norm decision variables, namely:
xi ∈ {0, 1} 1 ≤ i ≤ |N | (7)
Notice also that the cost of encoding the MNSP as a linear pro-
gram is O(m · |N | + |NN|(|NN|−2)
2
), where m = |Rg| + |Rx|,
and |NN|(|NN|−2)
2
) is the cost of encoding the substitutability con-
straints.
The specification above corresponds to a maximization problem
whose constraints are all inequalities. Hence, it is in standard form
and it can be solved with state-of-the-art linear program solvers
such as CPLEX or Gurobi.
EXAMPLE 2. Following our previous example in Figure 1, we
need five binary variables (x1, . . . , x5) to decide which norms to
select to solve the MSNP. If we consider r(ni) = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤
5, then there are four norm systems that maximise the objective
function in equation 1 and satisfy constraints 2 to 7, namely: Ω1 =
{n1, n4}, Ω2 = {n1, n5}, Ω3 = {n2, n4}, and Ω4 = {n2, n5}.
These alternative norm systems are listed along the first column of
Table 1.
Finally, it may be worth mentioning that prior to determining the
maximum sound norm system, one may wonder if there always is
a sound norm system. This leads us to pose next problem that, de-
spite its simplicity, provides us with further insights into the prob-
lem under study.
PROBLEM 2. Given a Norm Net NN= 〈N,R〉 composed by set
of norms N and their relationships R, we aim at assessing if there
is some sound (non-empty) Ω ⊆ N .
Given the binary nature of the norm relationships, norm systems
composed by any single norm from N will always comply with
constraints, and thus, there will always exist at least |N | alternative
sound norm systems.
3.2 Computing representation power
As previously mentioned, we aim at computing the norm sys-
tem that represents the largest number of norms in the norm net,
which may not be the same as taking the largest number of norms
because we must consider generalisation relations. Hence, we in-
troduce alternative definitions of the representation power function
r to compute the representation power of norms.
In this paper we propose two different variations of the represen-
tation power function. First, the inclusion power function considers
as representation power the number of norms directly generalised
or indirectly generalised (by being an ancestor) of a norm. Thus,
it provides a local measure of representation power. Second, the
generalisation power function measures the representation power
of a norm based on its position in a generalisation hierarchy: the
deeper a norm is in the generalisation hierarchy (the farther from
the most general norm), the lower its representation power. The
next subsections detail both functions.
3.2.1 Inclusion power
The inclusion power representation function is a function rI :
N → N that maps each norm to the number of norms it generalises.
Given a norm, its generalisation power is obtained by combining
the norms that it directly generalises together with the norms that its
children generalise. If a norm does not generalise any other norm,
we will set its inclusion power to 1. This leads to the following
recursive definition of inclusion power:
rI(ni) =

1 if 6 ∃rj ∈ N, (ri, rj) ∈ Rg
1 +
∑
nj∈Children(ni)
rI(nj) otherwise
In our example in figure 1, the inclusion power of n3 is 3, whereas
it is 1 for the rest of norms because none generalises other norms.
3.2.2 Generalisation power
The generalisation power representation function is a function
rg : N → (0, 1] that maps each norm to its generalisation power.
Informally, the less ancestors a norm has, the higher its generalisa-
tion power. Thus, a norm that has no ancestors takes on the max-
imum generalisation power (1). The generalisation power lowers
as norms are deeper in the generalisation hierarchy (i.e., are more
and more specific, and hence have more ancestors). If the gener-
alisation power of norm ni is larger than that of norm nj , we will
prefer to include ni in our norm system. This is because their gen-
eralisation powers tell us that ni is further up in the generalisation
hierarchy than nj , and hence closer to more general norms.
Algoritm 1 describes how generalisation power is computed for
a Norm Net NN= 〈N,R〉. Initially, lines 2-3 create two initial data
structures: g[], a unidimensional array storing the representation
powers for the norms in N ; and P , a set of the norms for which the
generalisation power needs to be computed (initiallyN ). Next, line
4 computes, by invoking function getNonGeneralised(), the subset
G ⊆ N of norms not being generalised by any other norm (i.e.,
G ← {ni ∈ S | @nj s.t. (nj , ni) ∈ Rg}). Lines 5-7 assign a
value of 1 for all the norms in G and remove them from P . The
rest of the algorithm is devoted to repeat, while there are still norms
in S, the computation of the generalisation powers for subsequent
levels in the generalisation hierarchy. Method SiblingGroups(P ,
NN) in line 9 selects those norms that are generalised by norms
that do not belong to P (i.e., ni s.t. (nj , ni) ∈ Rg and nj ∈
N \ P) and groups them by siblings so that it returns SibList[],
a list of sets of siblings Ps = {ns1, . . . , nsk} s.t. (nj , ns1) ∈
Rg, . . . , (nj , nsk) ∈ Rg for each common parent nj . Then, line
12 assigns, for each sibling norm ni ∈ Ps, a generalisation value
g[i] = g[j]|Ps| , which corresponds to the generalisation power of its
parent nj2 over the number of siblings. Once it is computed for
all norms in Ps, the entire subset is subtracted from P (see line
2Notice that by construction, all norms in N \ P do have a com-
puted generalisation power.
13). Finally, the algorithm returns the g[] array that is used for
the implementation of function gi(ni) =g[i]. Thus for example,
if we have a norm ng generalising two other norms ns1 and ns2,
and ns1 in turn generalises two additional norms ns11 and ns12,
we would have the following generalisation powers: rg(n1) = 1;
rg(ns1) = rg(ns2) = 1/2; and rg(ns11) = ng(ns12) = 1/4.
Notice that this algorithm assigns a value to all norms in N and
traverses in subsequent generalisation levels all the norms in a gen-
eralisation tree hierarchy, and thus, its complexity is O(l · |Rg| +
|N |) being l the maximum generalisation level (i.e., the depth of
the deeper generalisation hierarchy).
Algorithm 1 Generalisation power computation
1: procedure GENERALISATIONCOMP(NN)
2: g[1..|N |] . generalisation power array
3: P ← N . set of pending norms
4: G← getNonGeneralised(P , NN) . general norms
5: for each norm ni ∈ G do
6: g[i]← 1
7: P ← P \ {ni}
8: while P 6= ∅ do
9: SibList[]← getSiblingGroups(P , NN)
10: for each Ps in SibList[] do
11: for each sibling ni ∈ Ps do
12: g[i]← g[j]/|Ps|
13: P ← P \ Ps
14: end while
15: return g[1..|N |] . all values being defined
EXAMPLE 3. Following our example in Figure 1, we can com-
pare the two alternative representation power functions described
above. On the one hand, if we employ inclusion power as repre-
sentation function, the maximum norm system is Ω = {n3}. Natu-
rally, Ω = {n3} (see second column in Table 1) has been preferred
over the rest of sound norm systems, since its representation power
is 3, whereas the representation power for norm systems with two
norms (e.g., Ω = {n1, n4}) is 2. On the other hand, if we con-
sider generalisation power instead, there are four equally-valued
maximum norm systems, namely Ω1 = {n1, n4}, Ω2 = {n1, n5},
Ω3 = {n2, n4}, and Ω4 = {n2, n5}, as shown along the third
column of Table 1.
Overall, using alternative representation power functions results
in different maximum norm systems. The one to use is a deci-
sion left to the decision maker. In any event, representing as many
norms as possible may not always be the only criterion to enact a
norm system. This is the case if the decision maker considers fur-
ther criteria –such as, for instance, the costs associated to norms.
Next section tackles this issue.
4. MULTI-OBJECTIVEOPTIMISATIONFOR
NORM DECISION MAKING
In addition to pursuing norm representation maximisation when
choosing the norms to enact in a society, most often, regulation au-
thorities cannot ignore the fact hat norm deployment has associated
costs. This section deals with the combination of both criteria –i.e.,
representation power and associated costs– to decide the norm sys-
tem to enact.
Norm costs may represent monetary expenses derived from regu-
latory processes –such as norm establishment or norm enforcement–
as well as non-monetary aspects –such as social implications or
political correctness– that can be somehow quantified. Given a
norm system, here we will consider that the cost of a norm sys-
tem can be obtained by adding the value of its norms, namely
cost(Ω) =
∑
ni∈Ω c(ni), where c(ni) stands for the cost of norm
ni. Furthermore, we make the (reasonable) assumption that costs
are bounded by a maximum budget b (i.e., the price regulatory au-
thorities are willing to pay) that is available to cover the expenses
of imposing those norms in the resulting Norm System. Then, we
can cast the decision problem faced by the decision maker as the
following multi-objective optimisation problem.
PROBLEM 3. Given a Norm Net NN= 〈N,R〉, a representa-
tion power function r, and a fixed budget b, the maximum norm
system problem with limited budget (MNSPLB) is the problem of
finding a sound norm system Ω ⊆ N with maximum representation
power and minimum cost limited by some non-negative budget b.
In order to solve the MNSPLB, we will try to cast it as a linear
program, likewise we did for the MNSP in section 3.1. Notice
though that solving the MNSPLB amounts to solving the following
optimisation problem:
max
|N|∑
i=1
r(ni) · xi
min
|N|∑
i=1
c(ni) · xi
(8)
subject to constraints 2 to 7, namely the constraints that guarantee
the soundness of the norm system, and a further constraint:
|N|∑
i=1
c(ni) · xi ≤ b, (9)
where b ≥ 0, to ensure that the cost of the norm system does
to go beyond the limited budget. The multi-objetive optimisation
problem represented by expression 8 above can be formulated as
a single-objective problem by aggregating the two objectives by
means of scalarisation [16]. This is achieved by: (i) normalising
the representation and cost values; and (ii) prioritising representa-
tion and cost values by means of weight values. On the one hand,
we can readily normalise representation values by considering a
maximum representation power. We can safely set this value to
be Rmax = ∑nj∈GN r(nj), where recall that GN stands for the
set of norms that are not directly generalised by any other norm.
On the other hand, cost values can be normalied by means of the
maximum budget. As to how to prioritise representation costs and
values, we can simply employ a weightwr to weigh the importance
of maximising norm representation power, and another weight wc
to weigh the importance of minimising norm costs.
Putting all this together, the MNSPLB can be cast as a single-
objective optimisation problem that can be solved by the following
linear program:
max
[ wr
Rmax ·
|N|∑
i=1
xi · r(ni) +wc · (y− 1
b
|N|∑
i=1
xi · c(ni)
]
(10)
subject to the constraints in equations 2-7, the budget constraint in
equation 9, plus the following additional constraints:
• The auxiliary indicator variable y must be assigned as fol-
lows:
y =
 1 if
|N|∑
i=1
xi > 0
0 Otherwise
Notice that the assignment above captures the satisfaction of
the following non-linear constraint:
∑|N|
i=1 xi > 0 =⇒ y =
1. Thus, the indicator variable will take on value 1 the deci-
sion variables indicate that at least one norm is selected as
part of the norm system, and value 0 when the selected norm
system is empty (namely xi = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |N |).
In other words, the indicator variable y is binary, and hence
must satisfy that:
y ∈ {0, 1} (11)
Thus, the indicator variable guarantees that nothing is added
to the objective function if no norm is chosen. Furthermore,
this indicator variable allows us to turn the minimisation prob-
lem in equation 8 into a maximisation problem, since finding
the norm system with minimum (normalised) cost ( 1
b
∑|N|
i=1 xi·
c(ni)) amounts to maximising expression y − 1b
∑|N|
i=1 xi ·
c(ni).
However, notice that the addition of indicator variable y re-
quires the satisfaction of a non-linear constraint (i.e., an im-
plication). Hence, in order to keep the problem linear, we
will linearise such constraint as follows:
y ≤
|N|∑
i=1
xi ≤M · y (12)
where M is a very large number. 3
• The weights to measure the importance of maximising rep-
resentation power and minimising cost must satisfy:
wr + wc = 1 wr, wc ∈ [0, 1] (13)
The next example helps us illustrate how different elements in
our multi-objective decision function influence the norms that are
finally chosen to establish in a society. Specifically, we focus on the
influence of: using our different representation power functions;
changing norm costs; and variations in the total budget limit.
EXAMPLE 4. In our example, we could initially assume a max-
imum budget of 5 and consider the following costs: n1 has no as-
sociated cost because it requires no additional actions; n2 has an
associated cost of 2 since it requires passengers to interact with
passport registration machines and a few staff members; the cost of
n3 is 5 due to the fact that it requires form fulfilling, gathering, and
post-processing; and n4 and n5, which are more specific than n3,
just cost 2. Hence: b=5, c1=0, c2=c4=c5=2, c3=5. Moreover, in
this example we will equally value the importance of norm repre-
sentation and deployment cost, and thus, we set wr = wc = 0.5,
and, finally, the maximum representation power is computed as
Rmax = 5 when considering rI whereas Rmax = 3 if rg is used
instead.
Now, considering rg –the generalization power function– in equa-
tion 10, with restrictions from equations 2-7, 9, and 11-13, the lin-
ear program solver returns Ω = {n1} as the optimally sound norm
system (see first Ω in fifth column in Table 1). Nevertheless, if cost
of norm n1 is increased up to c1 = 6, since not checking passports
at the border may cause political problems with the neighbouring
countries, the solver will then choose Ω = {n2} to be the optimally
sound norm system (see second Ω in fifth column in Table 1).
Alternatively, if we consider the inclusion power function rI in-
stead, but keep initial costs assumptions (i.e.,c1 = 0) Ω = {n1}
remains as the optimally sound norm system (as shown in first Ω
3In our problem M can be defined to be strictly larger than |N |.
Table 1: Proposed problems formulation and results for the exam-
ple in Figure 1.
MNSP MNSP MNSPLB MNSPLB
Max. Max. Multi-objt. Multi-objt.
Criteria max.
incl.
max.
gen.
max. incl.
min. cost
max. gen.
min. cost
Objective
function
1 1 10 10
Represent.
power r
inclus.
rI
generl.
rg
inclusion
rI
generalisat.
rg
Constraints 2-7 2-7 2-7,9,11-13 2-7,9,11-13
Example
solutions
Ω =
{n3}
Ω =
{n1, n4},
{n1, n5},
{n2, n4},
{n2, n5}
Ω = {n1} Ω = {n1}
Ω = {n1, n4}, Ω = {n2}
{n1, n5}
Ω = {n2},
{n4}, {n5}
Ω = {n4}, {n5}
Ω = {n3}
in fourth column in Table 1). In fact, this result does not change
if we decrease the maximum budget to b = 4. However, if we fur-
ther increase it to b = 10, this optimally sound norm system is
enlarged to include one of the specific norms so that Ω = {n1, n4}
or Ω = {n1, n5} in second Ω in Table 1’s fourth column. Fur-
thermore, the solver also computes different results for c1 = 6 and
maximum budgets: b = 4 produces three possible optimally sound
norm systems: Ω = {n2}, Ω = {n4}, and Ω = {n5} (see third
Ω in fourth column); b = 5 implies two possible optimally sound
norm systems Ω = {n4} and Ω = {n5}; and finally, b = 10 re-
sults in Ω = {n3}, since the inclusion power of n3 can compensate
its high cost (c3 = 5) when normalised by 10.
Previous example has briefly illustrated how several factors in our
multi-objective decision function influence the computed result.
Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, we assume the regulatory
authorities’ particular needs will naturally determine these factors.
It is important to have in mind that our aim here is limited to model
alternative problems, and thus, we summarise them in subsequent
columns in Table 1. Specifically, first raw describes in plain (ab-
breviated) language the criteria that has been applied for the for-
malisation of each problem. Then, second row references the equa-
tion that describes the objective function. Third row specifies the
actual representation power function in use. Fourth row lists the
constraints to which the objective function is subject to. And fi-
nally, last row compiles the different norm systems that have been
computed for our running example.
5. MORAL VALUES IN NORM DECISION
MAKING
So far we have considered quantitative criteria that regulation
authorities can take into account when choosing the norms to enact
in a society. However, decision makers may also require to assess
the moral values promoted by the norms in a given norm network
under analysis. Here we understand that a norm supports a given
moral value when the norm is meant to accomplish a goal that is
aligned with (or promotes) the moral value. In this case, we will
assume that the society has moral/social preferences over values.
Thus, bringing in values into the norm decision making of regula-
tory authorities can be regarded as a qualitative criterion.
Based on the moral/social preferences over values, to reason
about norm systems we must be able to compare them in terms
of the values that they support. The principle that we adhere to
is: the more preferred the values supported by a norm system,
the more preferred that norm system. Thus, ideally, the decision
maker would like to opt for the norm system that supports the most
preferred values out of all the sound norm systems. Nonetheless,
we cannot forget that further criteria such as representation power
and cost, as dicussed in sections 3 and 4, must be part of the deci-
sion making. This section is devoted to extend the multi-objective
decision-making problem introduced in section 4 to account for the
moral values supported by norms.
Our first goal is to be able to quantitatively reason about norm
systems based on the qualitative preferences over the moral values
that they support. First, in order to connect moral values and norms,
we adapt some value-related definitions by Bench-Capon et al.[9].
Thus, we shall consider V as a non-empty set of moral values in
a society. We will assume that values are not connected objects,
namely there are no relationships between them, like e.g. comple-
mentarity. Moreover, we will assume that there is a total order (no
ties)  over the moral values in V that reflects the moral/social
preferences over them. Without loss of generality, we can assume
that v1  v2  . . .  v|V |. Now, we can obtain the value(s) sup-
ported by each norm by means of a function val : N → 2V \ ∅.
Thus, val(ni) stands for the set of values promoted by norm ni.
Now we introduce a utility function that will allow us to cap-
ture the total ordering over values. The utility of a value can be
calculated as:
u(vi) = 1 +
|V |∑
k=i+1
u(vk) (14)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ |V |. From this definition, it is clear that u(vi) >
u(vj) ⇔ vi  vj From this, we can readily calculate the value
support of a norm ni by adding the utility of the values supported
by the norm as follows:
un(ni) =
∑
v∈val(ni)
u(v) (15)
And from this, we can compute the value support for a given
norm system Ω ⊆ N by adding the utility of the values supported
by each one of its norms as:
uN (Ω) =
∑
n∈Ω
un(n) (16)
Notice that utility function uN allows us to lift the preferences
defined as a linear order over single moral/social values to a pref-
erence relation over bundles of norms. Thus, we will say that
Ω  Ω′ ⇔ uN (Ω) > uN (Ω′). Interestingly, the lifting of pref-
erences provided by the uN utility function satisfies two interest-
ing properties: (i) responsiveness [8]; and (ii) monotonicity. Infor-
mally, responsiveness (also called pairwise-dominance), states that
if in a norm system {n2, n3}, n3 is replaced by a better (supporting
more preferred values) norm, e.g. n1, then {n2, n1}makes a better
norm system. Monotonicity states that if Ω ⊃ Ω′, then Ω  Ω′.
These observations are fomally captured in the folllowing lemma.
LEMMA 2. The utility function uN guarantees responsiveness
and monotonicity.
PROOF. 2. To prove responsiveness it suffices to show that given
a norm system Ω such that ni ∈ Ω, nj 6∈ Ω, and nj  ni, then
Ω\{ni}∪{nj}  Ω. Let us note Ω−i = Ω\{ni}. Since uN (Ω) =
uN (Ω−i) + un(ni) < uN (Ω−i) + un(nj) = uN (Ω−i ∪ {nj}),
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Figure 2: Example of rules of border control (n1, . . . , n5) together
with the values they support (v1, v2).
then Ω\{ni}∪{nj}  Ω holds. As for monotonicity, this immedi-
ately follows from the definition of utility of a value in 14. Given two
norm systems such that Ω ⊃ Ω′, it is clear that uN (Ω) > uN (Ω′)
since the value support for each norm in Ω \Ω′ is greater or equal
than 1, and hence Ω  Ω′.
At this point, we can quantitatively compare norm systems based
on the values that they support. Hence, we are ready to define a
new multi-objective optimisation problem involving values as an
extension of problem 3.
PROBLEM 4. Given a Norm Net NN= 〈N,R〉, a representa-
tion power function r, a fixed budget b, a set of values V and a lin-
ear order over its values, the value-based maximum norm system
problem with limited budget (VMNSPLB) is the problem of finding
a sound norm system Ω ⊆ N with maximum representation power,
minimum cost limited by some non-negative budget b, and maxi-
mum value support.
This problem can be encoded as a linear program by extend-
ing the one in section 4. In order to embed the maximisation of
the value support of normative systems in the objective function of
expression 8, we require: (i) a normalisation constant for the val-
ues of uN ; and (ii) some prioritisation weight wv that measures
the relative importance of maximising value support. Notice that
we can safely normalise moral values by considering Vmax =∑|N|
i=1 un(ni) as the normalisation constant. Then, solving the
VMNSPLB amounts to solving the following linear program, which
combines the maximisation of representation power, the minimisa-
tion of cost, and the maximisation of value support:
max
[ wr
Rmax ·
|N|∑
i=1
xi · r(ni) + wc · (y − 1
b
|N|∑
i=1
xi · c(ni))+
+
wv
Vmax ·
|N|∑
i=1
xi · un(ni)
]
(17)
subject to constraints from equations 2 to 7, 9, 11, and 12, together
with a reformulation of the weight constraints (in eq. 13) as:
wr + wc + wv = 1 wr, wc, wv ∈ [0, 1] (18)
EXAMPLE 5. In our example, as Figure 2 shows, we can con-
sider that n1 supports the “free movement of persons” value (v1),
whereas n2, . . . , n5 support the “safety” value (v2). Let us con-
sider that the society prefers “free movement” to “safety” (namely
“free movement”  “safety”), then, u(v1) = 2 and u(v2) = 1
and that moral values are the only criterion to consider (i.e., wr =
wc = 0 and wv = 1). Therefore, our problem amounts to finding
the sound norm system that has maximum value support. Then, if
we encode the problem, a linear program solver results in two al-
ternative solutions Ω = {n1, n4}, Ω = {n1, n5}. In other words,
they constitute two different value-optimal sound norm systems.
6. DISCUSSION: DEALINGWITHNORMS
IN FORCE
So far we have considered that a norm net does contain all the
norms and relationships a decision maker is to reason about. How-
ever, this many not be typically the case. Instead, she may already
count on a collection of norms currently in force. If this is the case,
the decision making process must consider such norms as part of
the norm reasoning together with the norm net containing a new
collection of candidate norms. Here we identify two main strategies
to tackle this type of reasoning: (1) to consider that norms in force
must be preserved; and (2) to consider that norms in force must
not be necessarily preserved. The first strategy will have to con-
sider that norms in force translate into hard constraints in the norm
decision making process, whereas the second strategy adds more
flexibility to the decision maker. In what follows, we discuss how
these strategies can be readily accommodated in our optimisation-
based framework.
Henceforth, we shall consider thatN0 stands for a set of norms in
force and NN= 〈N,R〉 stands for a norm net containing candidate
norms to reason about together with their relationships. Whatever
the strategy we adopt, we must build an extended norm net that
merges the norms in force with the norm net. This will result in
a new norm net NN′ = 〈N0 ∪ N,R ∪ R0〉, where R′ stands for
generalisation, exclusivity and substitutability relationships hold-
ing between the norms in force in N0 and the norm candidates in
the norm net, namely in N .
EXAMPLE 6. Figure 3 shows an extension of the example in
figure 1. The norms in force in N0 are the following norms:
n6 : Prohibition(all_passengers, unattend_luggage)
n7 : Obligation(all_passengers, passport_control)
Norm n6 prohibits all passengers to leave their luggage unattended
and norm n7 forces all passengers to go through passport control.
Notice that there is a new exclusivity relation between n7 and n1,
so that (n7, n1) ∈ R0 will be added to the new norm net NN’.
Now we are ready to consider how to preserve the norms in force
within our optimisation framework. This can be readily achieved
by encoding the optimisation problem of choice for the extended
norm net. However, imposing that the norms in force (i.e., in N0)
are always selected as part of the norm system requires to add fur-
ther constraints to our optimisation problem. Thus, we add the fol-
lowing constraints:
xn = 1 for all n ∈ N0 (19)
EXAMPLE 7. Consider again our example in Figure 3. Obvi-
ously, the norms to append to N0 = {n6, n7} will depend on the
prioritising criteria. However, norm n1 in first Ω in Table 1’s last
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n5=Obl(visitors
, fulfil form)
n4=Obl(locals, 
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NNN0
Figure 3: Example of N0, a Norm Net NN’, and an exclusivity
relation between norms in N0 and N .
column cannot be part of the resulting norm system because of its
incompatibility with n7. Hence, n2, n3, n4, n5 would constitute the
norm candidates to be added to N0.
Finally, consider that not all norms in force must be preserved.
This adds more flexibility to the decision maker, who may discover
a norm system that is actually better (according to the decision cri-
teria of choice) than the norm system resulting of the preservation
of the norms in force. Notice that, in this case, we just need to en-
code our optimisation problem of choice for the extended norm net
NN’ without adding any further constraints like 19.
EXAMPLE 8. Going back to our running example, if maximum
budget is b=5, norms n6 and n7 have cost 1, n1 has 0 cost, and
we use rg , then new norm net becomes NN’=〈{n1, n6}, ∅〉. As a
consequence, n7 would be replaced by n1 in N ′. Alternatively, in
case we consider again c1=6, no actual changes would take place
in N0 so that NN’=〈{n6, n7}, ∅〉.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
The contribution of this paper is the modelling of a variety of
norm decision-making problems faced by policy makers when choos-
ing the norms to enact in a society. Our modeling assumes that a
policy maker has knowledge about candidate norms to enact and
the relationships between such norms. In particular, our work char-
acterises generalisation, exclusivity, and substitutability as norm re-
lationships. Furthermore, we show that the decision-making prob-
lems faced by policy makers can be cast as optimisation problems
with multiple decision criteria (representation power, cost, and as-
sociated moral values). To the best of our knowledge, using moral
values as a norm selection criterion is a particularly relevant contri-
bution to the Normative Multi-Agent Systems research community.
Furthermore, the complexity of the resulting optimisation problems
makes their solving non trivial. And yet, we managed to encode
them as linear programs so that they can be solved with the aid of
state-of-the-art linear programming solvers.
However, our work opens many interesting paths to future re-
search. First, it is worth to conduct an empirical evaluation investi-
gating the empirical hardness of different norm decision scenarios
depending on the density of norm relationships. Second, reasoning
about norms and values could be taken a step further by consider-
ing that norms support positively or negatively values. Moreover,
from a pragmatic perspective: we could deal with a partial order
(instead of a total order) over values, perform automated discovery
of norm relationships, and embed our decision-making solvers into
a decision support tool for policy makers.
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